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In a recent Commentary for 
 
Area
 
, Roger Keil and
Harris Ali (2006) called attention to some features of
the 2003 SARS outbreak that were pertinent to con-
cerns over avian influenza. They noted that SARS
highlighted the global connectivity of cities (which
resulted in SARS’ rapid spread), spatial inequalities
in healthcare and governance, and the fragility of
multicultural values (as the disease was branded as
Asian). However, these welcome comments focused
predominantly on the situation that will arise if the
H5N1 strain of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
(HPAI) confirms our worst fears and evolves into a
form transmissible from human to human. At present,
despite the fact that people have contracted the disease
from close contact with infected birds, avian influenza
remains an animal disease and should be no less
interesting to geographers because of that fact. Con-
sider that, in 2001, an epidemic of foot and mouth
disease (FMD) in the UK had far-reaching political
and economic consequences despite never posing a
particular risk to human health (Donaldson 
 
et al.
 
 2006).
FMD also highlighted global connectivity, with livestock
and meat export bans imposed on the UK under
WTO regulations, and attempts to trace the route of
the ‘Pan-Asia’ strain of the virus into the country.
As Keil and Ali note, ‘the geography of globaliza-
tion is a geography of disease’ (2006, 108), but we
would add that it is neither solely a geography of
diseases that might infect humans nor an entirely
contemporary phenomenon. These points can be
elaborated by an exploration of what we would call
‘political biogeography’ – an enterprise in accordance
with geography’s current focus on politics 
 
within
 
 the
‘natural’ or nonhuman world (see, for example, Castree
2003). Whilst biogeography has traditionally focused
on the distribution of organisms over space and time,
political biogeography should concentrate on the mutual
interference of human and nonhuman systems in this
distribution. The agri-food system, especially when
distorted by disease, provides perhaps the most
compelling case for treatment and the contemporary
mobility of animal diseases, their viruses and prions,
has already engaged geographical imaginations
(Hinchliffe 2001 2002; Donaldson and Wood 2004;
Law 2006). Geographies of animal disease involve
borders, bureaucracy, surveillance and biosecurity.
They also entail movement, seen as disease spread.
Crucially, they imply a politics of time and space
taken 
 
together
 
. Pathogens control space in as far
as they move faster than the countermeasures set
against them. Virilio captures this notion well:
 
territory and movement are linked. ... research on the
logic and impact of speed, necessarily implies the study
of the organisation of territory. Whoever controls the
territory possesses it. Possession of territory is not
primarily about laws and contracts, but first and
foremost a matter of movement and circulation.
(Virilio in Armitage 2000, unpaginated)
 
For Whitehead (1920), events have fundamental
ontological status; rather than taking place in space
and time, they give rise to space and time. Extrapolating
 2
 
Commentary
 
Area
 
 Vol. 39 No. 2, pp. 000–000, 2007
ISSN 0004-0894 © The Authors.
Journal compilation © Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers) 2007
 
from this concept of events as generative, Barry (2002)
has noted that events can become ‘political events’
through processes of inspection and investigation.
Political events raise problems and open up debates,
as can be seen very clearly in historic and contem-
porary disease events, yet the speed of the events,
and also the relative endurance of responses, have
changed. It is not so much the connectivity that is
new (
 
pace
 
 Keil and Ali), but the speed of movement
in both the event and its inspection.
In 1920 a devastating outbreak of the cattle dis-
ease, Rinderpest, in Belgium was traced to zebus
(
 
Bos primigenius indicus
 
, or humped cattle
 
1
 
) from
India being transported to Brazil via Antwerp. This
happened in an era when Keil and Ali note that sea-
travel often provided an effective quarantine situa-
tion for human-borne diseases. The Rinderpest
outbreak led to the formation, in 1924, of the global
animal disease surveillance body, the OIE (Office
International des Epizooties, now more commonly
known as the World Organisation for Animal Health).
In 1998 the OIE became the official health and sani-
tary standards body for animals and animal products
in international trade after an agreement with the
WTO, firmly acknowledging in the emerging struc-
tures of global governance the entanglement of global
trade and animal disease spread. Disease events in this
entangled mesh are more common, faster and mix times,
spaces and scales in more unexpected ways, producing
a continuous flux of temporary territorialisations.
The February 2007 outbreak of HPAI in a large Bernard
Matthews (BM) poultry production and processing
facility in the county of Suffolk in the east of England
provides a clear illustration. This was the first major
agricultural incidence of H5N1 HPAI in the United
Kingdom and was initially announced as the likely
result of contact with unspecified infected wild birds.
However, consultation with ornithologists revealed
that there were no wild bird movements from areas
already harbouring HPAI within the timescale of
infection (Defra 2007). Attention shifted to connections
between the Suffolk facility and infected farmed
geese in Hungary, where BM also has premises. The
company’s Commercial Director insisted that paper-
work on all transactions with Hungary ruled out any
imports from restricted or infected areas of Hungary
(Today Programme, BBC Radio 4, 9 February 2007),
seemingly suggesting that the paperwork inscriptions
were somehow prescriptive of the behaviour of viruses
(or, indeed, of a multitude of farmers, transportation
firms, abattoir workers, bureaucrats and so on). Mole-
cular analysis subsequently revealed a 99.9 per cent
similarity between the H5N1 viruses in Suffolk and
Hungary (Defra 2007), suggesting that this was the
most likely source of infection. BM’s paper trail
cleared them of any wrongdoing, yet the virus still
arrived from Hungary.
Internal geographies of the Suffolk plant itself
were also critical. BM representatives initially re-
butted suggestions that their own procedures or lack
of care could have produced the outbreak, arguing
that they had ‘the highest biosafety standards of
anyone’ (cited by Vidal and Lewis 2007, unpagi-
nated). Workers at the plant were clearly segregated
by each being assigned to specific turkey sheds, and
subject to rigorous hygiene procedures. As previ-
ously observed in the case of FMD (Donaldson and
Wood 2004), the surveillance of humans, rather
than the surveillance of the disease and its vectors,
is at the forefront of biosecurity practice. In the
event, even this limited definition of biosecurity was
suspended as the workers segregated duty-pattern
was broken to enable cleansing of the sheds where
infection had occurred. Nonhuman factors at the
Suffolk site included gulls which fed on meat trim-
mings from the turkey processing plant left in open
skips and roosted on the leaking roofs of the turkey
sheds, and rodents which could also find points of
entry into the turkey sheds. Additionally, no distinc-
tion appears to have been made between meat from
Suffolk and meat from Hungary and elsewhere,
which were combined to make processed turkey
products.
Animal disease events in the contemporary glo-
balising agri-food system consist of the seeming
folding together of places and objects – diseased
geese in Hungary and a turkey production facility
in Suffolk – but these foldings are temporary and
happen at speed. To investigate the pathway of the
virus to Suffolk, scientists had to construct a detailed
spatial and temporal map of events. Small variations
in the timings of trade contacts were significant in
determining possible vectors and the legality of the
trade activities (Food Standards Agency 
 
et al.
 
 2007).
In its rapid circulations through the agri-food system,
HPAI occupies a territory that cannot even be seen
by humans until after the event; that may no longer
exist for the virus by the time humans have mapped
it. But that mapping can have further consequences
because events also introduce significant, and unpre-
dictable, novelty (Stengers 2000). In 1920, Rinder-
pest in Belgium led to an enduring international
organisation. In 2001, FMD raised debate over the
governance of rural England. In 2007, the scrutiny
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of spatial-temporal connections within the Suffolk
disease event by Government and media served to
turn what might have remained solely a disease
event into a political event, a source of debate
which created space for renewed criticism of food
production and consumer safety (see, for example,
Blythman 2007). This suggests that in our political
biogeography, the consequential politics of the
ongoing distribution of organisms should concern us
at least as much the causal. Countering and exclud-
ing disease geographies might be a necessary part of
creating the world we want; including them more
fully is a necessary part of seeing the world we
have.
 
Note
 
1 The taxonomy of the zebu is a highly contested issue
which we do not intend to address here!
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